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1. Introduction
It didn’t take long for the rhetoricians to adopt the argument model Stephen E. Toulmin
presents in The Uses of Argument from 1958. Brockriede and Ehninger’s introductory article
two years later in Quarterly Journal of Speech paved the way by claiming the “superiority of
the Toulmin model in describing and testing arguments” (Brockriede & Ehninger, p. 46). The
following rhetorical tradition has agreed and incorporated Toulmin’s model in theoretical
articles and practical textbooks on rhetorical argumentation and debate to an extent that makes
the author of Rhetoric in the European Tradition conclude: “Over the years, The Uses of
Argument came to dominate the literature on debate and argumentation almost completely”
(Conley, p. 295).
Why is it that this ostracized logician has become an integrated part of the rhetorical
canon? What is so appealing about Toulmin’s thoughts on argumentation, in general, and his
argument model, in particular, to rhetoricians? The answer is simple, yet far-reaching. What
made him a pariah in the field of logic is what made him persuasive among rhetoricians: his
practical approach to the field of argumentation.
Rhetoric understood as an art, a classical techne, is essentially a practical activity guided
by prescriptive how-to advices and hands-on instructions (cf. Kennedy, p. 19). Not
surprisingly, then, a book titled The Uses of Argument would trigger rhetorical interest.
Brockriede and Ehninger point to this when they claim that Toulmin's structural model
provides “a practical replacement” to the syllogism that “promises to be of greater use in laying
out rhetorical arguments for dissection and testing than the methods of traditional logic.”
(Brockriede & Ehninger, p. 47) Anyone who has taught a course on argumentation, persuasive
speech or debate knows that the argument model presented in The Uses is in fact useful when
the students are to analyze and evaluate arguments in a public debate or want to critically test
their own main argument in a speech, text or debate. The model’s diagrammed structure with
lines and an arrow visualizes different argumentative functions, logical relations and inferential
steps far better than the linear syllogism. The vocabulary of claim, data and warrant is intuitive,
and it captures the different logical functions of a practical argument more precisely than the
syllogistic equivalents minor premise, major premise and conclusion. And finally, the three
additional elements backing, rebuttal and qualifier grant the uncertainty and opposition of reallife arguments a legitimate and visible place that is absent in the simpler syllogistic structure.
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The rebuttal and the qualifier at the same time point to an epistemological understanding
of the practical that can help explain Toulmin’s appeal to rhetoricians. When Toulmin accept
probability and field-dependence, he speaks the language of rhetoric. His claim that “Warrants
are of different kinds, and may confer different degrees of force on the conclusion they justify”
(Toulmin, 1958, p. 100) resonates well with an academic discipline that has always operated
in the practical and probable domain of endoxa, dealing with choices and actions and “things
that are for the most part capable of being other than they are” (Aristotle, Rhetoric, 1357a).
Context matters to Toulmin as it does to rhetoricians, and his epistemological ambition of
expanding “the court of reason” is on par with classical rhetorical thinking. (cf. Toulmin, 1958,
pp. 40-41) As expressed by the authors of Handbook of Argumentation Theory: “Perhaps
equally attractive seems to be Toulmin’s view of the context-dependency of the standards for
assessing argumentation, and his starting point that in establishing the relevant criteria the
supremacy of one particular field of argument over others must be rejected.” (van Eemeren et
al., p. 251) The Toulmin model not only makes it easy to assess real-life arguments, it captures
a world of variety and uncertainty, that made his logical colleagues feel uncomfortable, but
where rhetoricians feel at home.
It took a while longer for Toulmin himself to see the rhetorical connection. However, in
the canonized 1982 lecture “Logic and the Criticism of Argument”, the stray logician had
realized that there were minds outside the departments of philosophy that appreciated him more
than the Frege-influenced logicians of that time. The connection he saw was the topics: “Only
in retrospect it is apparent that – even though sleepwalkingly – I had rediscovered the topics of
the Topics, which were expelled from the agenda of philosophy in the years around 1900.”
(Toulmin, 1982, p. 256) This passage has been widely cited among rhetoricians who see it as
a sign of Toulmin’s association with rhetoric (cf. Conley, p. 295; Gabrielsen, pp. 60-61;
Godden, Section 4.; Golden, Berquist and Coleman, p. 251; Jasinski, p. 206).1 After all, you
can’t blame a rhetorician for being pleased about winning one over from Plato’s camp of
philosophers.
The question is if the rhetoricians have been too pleased. Has the rhetorical tradition been
too selective in the reading of Toulmin and too blind in its acceptance? The authors of
Handbook of Argumentation Theory seem to support the idea of a selective reading of
Toulmin’s work:
It is striking that most authors who used Toulmin’s model as a general model for
argumentation analysis – again, including Brockriede and Ehninger, Trent, and Toulmin
himself 20 years later – ignore the logical ambitions Toulmin intended his model to serve
with regard to the replacement of formal validity in the geometrical sense by validity in
the Toulminian procedural sense. (van Eemeren et al., p. 239)
Even though, the Toulmin model has proven useful to rhetoricians, as Brockriede and Ehninger
suggested and the long line of textbooks on argumentation after them have demonstrated, I
shall argue that the price of winning a philosopher has been losing something essentially
rhetoric. The rhetoricians have been all too willing to ignore the fact that Toulmin speaks the
rhetorical language with a distinct logical dialect and have not paid enough attention to the
aspects of Toulmin’s approach to practical argumentation that differs from a genuinely
rhetorical approach. The fact that the Toulmin model is more accurate and useful than

The passage echoes Otto Bird who connected the dots as early as 1961 in his article “The Re-Discovery of the
Topics”. Bird introduces his article: “This development, particularly in the form it takes in this last book, has
many similarities with the analysis of the Topics in medieval logic. The resemblance is so close, as I hope to show,
that it appears we are witnessing something of a re-discovery of the Topics” (p. 534).
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traditional logic does not make it potentially the most accurate and useful structural model of
rhetorical argumentation.
To get an idea of the shortcomings of the Toulmin model seen from a rhetorical
perspective, I shall outline an alternative rhetorical argument model that more fully captures
the inventive and persuasive power of the topics. The argument model focuses on argument as
a persuasive process, not as an inferential product, and shows the different strategic topical
choices that are involved in building a rhetorical argument. Before I get this far, however, I
will first take some time to show that Toulmin is justified in claiming that he has “rediscovered
the topics of the Topics”. But instead of seeing that as a sign of him becoming a rhetorician, I
shall see it indicative of his logical influence on rhetoric.
2. Toulmin’s limited logical approach to the topics
One can easily see why Toulmin must have enjoyed reading the Topics when he found that
ancient work of Aristotle that had been expelled from logic. Discontented as he was with the
rigid universalism of formal logic that “display arguments from different fields in a common
form” and “by appeal to a single, universal set of criteria applicable in all fields of argument
alike” (Toulmin, 1958, p. 39), he set out to reform what he saw as a ”corrupt tradition” of
philosophy (Toulmin, 1982, p. 254). In opposition to the logic in vogue at the time he wrote
The Uses of Argument, he was convinced that there are “many different ‘logical types’” (p. 13)
and “many sorts of assessment and grading” (p. 34). The reformative project was to make logic
applicable to the everyday use of arguments by accepting field-dependent standards for critical
assessment of ”the variety of steps from the data to conclusions which appear in the course of
justificatory arguments” (p. 12). He was confident ”that by treating logic as generalized
jurisprudence and testing our ideas against our actual practice of argument-assessment, rather
than against a philosopher’s ideal, we shall eventually build up a picture very different from
the traditional one” (p. 10). As he realized much later, the picture he was building then was in
fact a very traditional one.
In Aristotle’s Topics, Toulmin found a kindred spirit and an abundance of inference
options. The Topics accounted for all the inferential variation he found in the wild but which
had been banned from the laboratory of logic. The Topics offered him a fine-grained system of
around 300 acceptable ways to bridge data and conclusion that would accommodate his quest
for a functional and flexible logic where different kinds of problems call for different kinds of
warrants. The structured dialectical setting of the Topics with a questioner and a respondent
even resembled the courtroom setting he took as a paradigm case for the jurisprudence logic
he advocated for. As the authors of Handbook of Argumentation Theory put it: “Toulmin seems
to construe the arguments he is interested in as (dialectical) verbal products resulting from a
(dialectical) process of argumentative discourse” (van Eemeren et al., p. 212).
This is at the same time key to understanding why Toulmin’s project it not essentially
rhetorical. It is Aristotle’s dialectical approach to the topics that appealed to him, not his
rhetorical approach. And as we know from Aristotle’s own ambitions to make clear divisions
of labor between logic, rhetoric and dialectic, there is a fundamental difference between
rhetoric and dialectic. In “Revisiting Aristotle’s Topoi,” Christopher Tindale identifies the
difference between the dialectical and the rhetorical work of Aristotle: “the goals of the two
works are quite different, with the Topics suggesting a handbook for procedures to succeed in
dialectical exchanges or games (likely reflecting the activities of the Academy), and the
Rhetoric proposing means for persuasion of an audience” (Tindale, 2007, p. 1). It is the
dialectical understanding of the topics found in the Topics that resonated with Toulmin’s
reformative logical project, not the topical approach found in Aristotle’s Rhetoric or in later
works of Cicero and Quintilian whom he does not mention.
3

This has crucial consequences for the understanding of the topics and eventually for the
view on argumentation Toulmin brings to the rhetorical division. According to Joseph
Wenzel’s well-known effort to demarcate logic, dialectic and rhetoric as three distinct
perspectives on argumentation, “logic seeks to discover or develop canons of correct inference
that enable us to settle on certain expressions as reliable knowledge (Wenzel, p. 128). Hence,
it follows from the starting point in logic that Toulmin’s approach to argumentation focuses on
critical evaluation. Toulmin’s key interest in The Uses of Argument is “the ways in which we
set about grading, assessing and criticising” arguments (p. 12, cf. also p. 33 and 39). Keywords
are ”standards”, ”criteria”, “soundness” and “validity” – words that help “to keep in the centre
of the picture the critical function of the reason” (p. 8). What Toulmin found in the Topics was
exactly that – a method to formalize actual arguments in order to critically test the soundness
of the applied inference.2
The critical approach to argumentation influences Toulmin’s notion of audience. The
audience we meet in The Uses of Argument takes on the role of a persistent ”challenger”
(Toulmin, 1958, p. 97). The challenger poses critical questions such as “Does it really follow?”;
“Is it really a legitimate inference?” (p. 139); the recurring: “How do you get there” (cf. p. 98,
99 and 130); and “What have you got to go on?” (cf. p. 97, 98, 99, 140). In other words, the
challenger acts much like a questioner in a dialectical debate who critically tests the specific
inference-warrant applied by the speaker. The Toulmian challenger incarnates the court of
reason, a rational representative of an academic field who is capable of judging what are
acceptable and unacceptable warrants within that field – may that be sport, mathematics, law
or aesthetics. This differs from a rhetorical notion of an audience that is a far more complex
construct composed not only of rationality but also of values, interests, emotions, attitudes and
habitudes. A rhetorical audience would therefore be sensitive to both rational and emotional
influence, logos, ethos and pathos that is. More generally, Toulmin’s sensitivity to context is
captured in the abstract notion of “field,” which is a less dynamic substitute for a rhetorical
situation comprised of exigence, audience and constraints. (Bitzer, p. 6) Seen from a rhetorical
perspective, the notion of field lacks complexity and explanatory power when it comes to
describing persuasive argumentation.
The logical approach to argumentation has obvious consequences for the purpose and
design of argument model. As Toulmin says in introducing his model: “How, then, should we
lay an argument out, if we want to show the sources of its validity? And in what sense does the
acceptability or unacceptability of arguments depend upon their “formal” merits and defects?”
(Toulmin, 1958, p. 95). The arrow and the location of the claim to the right in the model indicate
an inferential movement from data towards claim supported by the warrant. If we pair this with
the fact that Toulmin uses the terms “claim” and “conclusion” interchangeably through chapter
3 in The Uses of Argument, we get a model that concludes with the claim – which is reminiscent
of a PPC structure. The vocabulary associated with the warrant also reveals its logical heritage.
The warrant contains “rules, principles, inference-licenses” (p. 98); it is what “justifies,”
“legitimates,” “authorizes,” “entitles,” “permits,” and “guarantees” the inferential step from
data to conclusion with a certain inferential “force.” It is within this logical framework of
evaluating and analyzing existing arguments that the topics of Topics serve as a critical tool. A
topos in the Toulmian approach is to be understood as an acceptable inference within a field
placed in the warrant element of the argument model – or what would today be referred to as
an “argument scheme.” The Toulmin model is essentially a logical argument model designed
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The subtitle of the book edited by David Hitchcock and Bart Verheij Arguing on the Toulmin Model is in this
sense telling: “New Essays in Argument Analysis and Evaluation.”
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to make visible the logical form and relations in order to critically assess the soundness of an
argument.3
Brockriede and Ehninger clearly saw that when they initially emphasized the critical
potential of the argument model “in laying out rhetorical arguments for dissection and testing”
(Brockriede & Ehninger, p. 47). And Tindale, from a more retrospective position, confirms the
Toulmin model’s logical influence on rhetoric: “His general model of “data” leading to a claim,
mediated by a “warrant” with a necessary “backing,” has been very influential as a new
standard of logical thinking, particularly among scholars of rhetoric and speech
communication” (Tindale, 2004, p. 8).
This points to an unfulfilled rhetorical and topical potential in the Toulmin model. For
all the model’s rhetorical usability, there’s something essentially rhetorical about the topics
that the model does not capture. His starting point in logic blinds him to a genuinely rhetorical
understanding and practical use of the topics that ultimately would lead to a differently
designed argument model.
First, as a result of Toulmin’s critical approach to argumentation, he doesn’t appreciate
the creative potential of the topics as a method to find possible persuasive arguments. What
Toulmin had sleepwalkingly rediscovered was the logical potential of the dialectical topics to
formalize arguments – not the rhetorical potential to invent them. What’s wanting in Toulmin’s
approach is the heuristic potential of the topics – or what Kienpointner refers to as the function
as “search formulas”: “The topoi are search formulas which tell you how and where to look for
arguments” (Kienpointner, p. 226). In the rhetorical tradition, the topics are an ars inveniendi,
a method for systematically searching for persuasive arguments. The topics found in the
rhetorical tradition present the persuader with catalogues of possible places to find
argumentative material. Cicero vividly stresses this heuristic quality of the topics in De
Oratore:
For, as if I were to point out a Mass of Gold that is buried in several Places, it would be
enough if I should describe the Signs and Marks of the Places where it lay; for then the
Person to whom I thus describ’d it, might find and dig it up with Ease and Certainty:
Thus, after I had made myself Master of these distinguishing Characters of Arguments,
they pointed out what I was in Search of, all the rest is to be wrought out by Care and
Invention. (Cicero, De Oratore, II, 41, 174)
The comparison between topical places and places in the physical world points to another
aspect of the topics that is missing in the Toulmin model – the actual places. Toulmin made
room for inferential variation in the warrant, but the model itself does not show this variation,
topical alternatives that is. What Tindale says about the topical tradition in general goes for
Toulmin as well: ”Largely suppressed here, though, is the alternative richness of the “place”
metaphor, some sense of which no account of the topoi should avoid” (Tindale, 2007, p. 4).
And he concludes the same article with the claim that there is “value carried through the
metaphor of place essentially attached to the concept of a topos; a value threatened if we think
only of topoi as argumentation schemes” (Tindale, 2007, p. 10). Following Tindale, we must
expect a structured argument model inspired by the rhetorical topics to take the place metaphor
seriously. Hence, where the central questions within Toulmin’s logical perception of the topics
3

Rigotti and Greco shares the dialectical approach to topic in their book Inference in Argumentation. A TopicsBased Approach to Argument Schemes where the introduce The Argumentum Model of Topics. The model differs
radically from the one I will outline later in its purpose and design as it focuses on topoi as inferential-logical
sources rather than as places to find persuasive arguments. The purpose of their model like Toulmin’s is to show
and asses inferential moves in an actual argument.

5

were: “What have you got to go on?”; ”How do you get there”; and the central questions within
a rhetorical perception of the topics would be, Where do you go?; and Where do you choose to
place your argument?
In the following I will proceed in a more constructive manner to outline an argument
model that takes rhetoric as its starting point and attempts to capture the creative as well as the
metaphorical understanding of the topics.
3. Outlining a rhetorical argument model inspired by the rhetorical topics
A rhetoric-born argument model would have to reflect the most defining characteristics of
rhetorical argumentation.
First, rhetorical argumentation has persuasion as its purpose. According to Aristotle,
rhetoric is the art of “discovering the available means of persuasion” (Aristotle, Rhetoric,
1355b). Wenzel clearly supports the persuasive purpose when he describes the nature of the
rhetorical perspective this way: “when we speak of studying “argument” from the rhetorical
perspective, we mean that we seek to understand certain elements embedded in the process of
persuasion. Thus, the rhetorical perspective construes “arguing” as a persuasive process”
(Wenzel, p. 124). Thus, a rhetorical argument model could be expected to serve as a practical
tool for someone’s intention to influence beliefs and behaviors – let us choose to call that
someone “the persuader”.
Having persuasion as its goal implies that rhetorical argumentation takes someone to be
persuaded into account. Secondly then, rhetorical argumentation is always directed to an
audience. Tindale, in building a general rhetorical model of argumentation, points to the
centrality of the audience and the dialogical nature of rhetoric in what he, inspired by Bakhtin,
refers to as the fundamental “addressivity” of rhetorical argumentation (Tindale, 2004, p. 103).
In every new rhetorical situation, the persuader faces the challenge of establishing a common
ground with the specific audience that will make them willing to act as “mediator of change”
(Bitzer, p. 4). In this respect, it is noteworthy that a defining feature of the Aristotelian
enthymeme is that it consists of fewer premises than the syllogism because the audience are
supposed to “supply” the suppressed premise to complete the argument. And so too, must any
rhetorical argument model be expected to reflect the fundamental addressivity of rhetorical
argumentation and indicate the presence of an audience.
Thirdly, a rhetorical approach to argumentation is concerned with the argumentative
process. Returning to the two quotes from Aristotle and Wenzel, we will see that they’re both
concerned with process: According to Wenzel “the rhetorical perspective construes “arguing”
as a persuasive process” (Wenzel, p. 124, italics mine); and according to Aristotle rhetoric is
the art of “discovering the available means of persuasion” (Aristotle, Rhetoric, 1355b, italics
mine). Hence, a rhetorical argument model must be designed with the objective to guide the
process of building a persuasive argument.
Topical thinking supports all these three defining traits of rhetorical argumentation. As
we shall see, in the model the rhetorical topics function to prescribe the different kind of places
the persuader ought to visit when building an argument suited to persuade a specific audience.
So finally, we are ready to see what a rhetorical argument model informed by the
rhetorical topics might look like:
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Let us take a closer look at the three main elements in the model – standpoint, common ground
and proof. What are their argumentative functions? At what point in the argument building
process do they become relevant? And how do they relate to the rhetorical topics?
At the center of the model we find the persuader’s standpoint. It is what the persuader
stands on and commits himself to in the practical domain of politics, ethics and aesthetics,
where things are “capable of being other than they are”. The standpoint is what motivates the
persuader to initiate the argumentative process, and in that sense, the choice and wording of
the standpoint marks the initial step in building a persuasive argument.
As indicated in the model, the persuader at this point faces a choice about what type of
standpoint he will present. Inspired by classical rhetorical stasis theory the persuader has four
strategic options on where to win a case: He can choose a standpoint about the facts of the case,
the definition, the evaluation, or the action to be taken (cf. Kienpointner, p. 228-230). The four
stasis represent four possible “places” where the persuader could “position” himself and find
the appropriate wording of the standpoint. So, the persuader must ask himself: What kind of
standpoint will have the most realistic chance of persuading this specific audience? This is the
first of three strategic topical choices in building a persuasive argument.
The next element in the rhetorical argument model is common ground. When the
standpoint is formulated the next step in the process is to find the substantial foundation of the
argument. Common ground is a mental meeting place between the persuader and the audience.
Common ground could be values – as it is said in Handbook of Argumentation Theory: “The
values upheld by a given audience can be used as a starting point for determining what that
audience will and will not accept” (van Eemeren et al., p. 268). More generally, everything that
captures a socially shared perspective in relation to a given case and context could form the
basis for common ground: ideas, ideologies, beliefs, motivations, norms, frames, narratives,
theories and methods. As the model illustrates, the persuader at this point in the process is again
faced with a strategic decision – this time about how to substantiate the standpoint in a way
that resonates with the shared world view, values and visions of the specific audience. The goal
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for the persuader is to strike what the Greeks would refer to as kairos, the Romans as aptum,
and Bitzer as a fitting response.
This is not an easy task. Christian Kock makes us aware that there are multiple
incommensurable dimensions of practical reasoning that must be weighed against each other.
(Kock, 2006) Christopher Tindale expresses the same point within a topical framework: “The
arguer needs not just to know her own mind, and the topoi resident there; but also the mind of
her audience and what topoi they are likely to recognize and, hence, to be persuaded by the
arguments drawn from them” (Tindale, 2007, p. 9). It is in this varied landscape of possible
topoi that the persuader must ask himself: Where can I “meet” my audience? What kind of
common ground relation can I build with my audience in support of my standpoint? This is
perhaps the most critical and difficult point in the argument building process.
Fortunately, the persuader is not left to his own idiosyncratic and limited horizon of
knowledge, values, beliefs, interests and habitudes in the search for common ground with his
audience. As with the standpoint, the topics provide him with a practical tool. To quote
Kienpointner’s elaboration on topoi as “search formulas”:
The search formulas help to select relevant arguments from the set of ‘endoxa’, that is,
the propositional content of the arguments has to be taken from the set of propositions
which are accepted by all or most people and/or by all or most experts. (Kienpointner,
1997, p. 226)
Through the rhetorical tradition we find different topoi catalogues that guide the persuader in
a systematic search for the “available means of persuasion” in relation to a specific subject or
genre. Let me give just a few examples to clarify how common ground is to be understood
within a topical framework. In book 1 of his Rhetoric Aristotle presents his “specific topoi”
listing commonly accepted taxonomies and examples of good and evil, honorable and
shameful, just and unjust. These lists provide the ancient rhetor with an armory of possible
common grounds for epideictic praise and blame, forensic accusation and defense, or
deliberative advice about future actions. As Rigotti and Greco notes: ”In the Rhetoric, the
examples that illustrate the list of topoi often report fragments of culturally important debates”
(Rigotti and Greco, p. 30). In that respect, today’s persuader would probably find most of the
Aristotelian catalogues of specific topoi insufficient and inadequate in the search for common
ground with a contemporary audience. Kock, however, makes a case for the usefulness of
another list of topoi found in Rhetorica ad Alexandrum. Here the unknown author provides the
young Alexander the Great with an inventory of common ways to argue for an action listing
eight possible justificatory perspectives: Just, lawful, expedient, honourable, pleasant, easy to
accomplish, practicable and necessary (Kock, pp. 254-255). According to Kock this list
presents “an inventory of the warrants available for practical reasoning” that could serve as a
possible expansion of Brockriede and Ehninger’s underdeveloped category of motivational
arguments. As a final example, I would like to mention a more contemporary topoi catalogue
that I have developed in collaboration with rhetorician Jonas Gabrielsen. The topoi catalogue
contains eight topoi that we have observed to be the most commonly applied perspectives in
political argumentation – and therefore would be relevant places to visit in the search for
common ground in political speeches: Economy, environment, ethics, health, culture,
legislation, aesthetics, religion.4 The precise nature of the topoi catalogue – how many and
what kinds of common grounds it contains – is less important in regard to the model. The
important point being that it is the topics that allow the persuader to navigate with open eyes
4

This exact list has not been published. But earlier versions have been published in Danish journals
RetorikMagasinet (Pontoppidan and Gabrielsen, 2009) and Nordicom-Information (Pontoppidan, Gabrielsen and
Jønch-Clausen, 2010).
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in the topical landscape of possible places to establish common ground with his audience. Or
to put it less metaphorically: The model shows that there are multiple ways to support the
standpoint and, hence, encourages the persuader to deliberately weigh the alternatives to make
an informed choice about where to ground his argument.
We now see that both the term “common” and “ground” are appropriately ambiguous to
capture what is going on at this step in the argument building process. “Common” takes on the
double meaning of the “ordinary, customary, usual, normal, habitual” and what is “united,
mutual.” Thereby the term sheds light on the Ciceronian point that it is much easier to find
what the audience has in common if one has a map of what is common. “Ground” evokes the
topical metaphor of “place”; it points to the function as the argument’s base; and it works as a
synonym for words native to argumentation theory such as reason, justification, rationale,
support and premise.
This leads us to the third and final element in the argument model: proof. Where
standpoint was tied to the persuader and common ground to the audience, the proof is tied to
the subject matter. Common ground and proof both function as justifications for the standpoint,
but where the common ground element is abstract and value oriented, the proof is concrete and
factual. The search for proof is controlled by the common ground chosen in the previous step.
If one for instance has chosen an economic common ground, the proof must be of the economic
kind as it is the common ground that makes a given type of proof relevant. This on the other
hand means that the proof as the final step in the process of building an argument has a double
support function: It substantiates the persuader’s standpoint; and it adds weight to the chosen
common ground thereby proving that it is a reasonable perspective in the case at hand. At this
point in the argument building process the persuader is looking for material support in the form
of for instance examples, analogies, expert statements, results of surveys or research,
observations, scientific definitions, laws, statistics – everything that could function as evidence
for both standpoint and common ground. Kock describes the content and the role of the proof
when he refers to “the topical tools of similarities, differences, and paradigmatic examples, as
well as the numerous devices of 'amplification' and 'diminution', with the aid of which we may
add to or detract from the weight of any given argument” (Kock, p. 257). A wisely chosen
example or analogy will at the same time strengthen the credibility of the standpoint and bolster
the relation between standpoint and common ground.
As the model shows, the persuader is again faced with a choice as it is possible to generate
more than one proof in relation to each common ground. And once again, the topics found in
the rhetorical tradition serve as a useful resource of the “available means of persuasion” – only
this time the means at hand are not common values and perspectives in a specific context, but
common types of proof. In Chapter 23 of Book 2 of his Rhetoric for instance, Aristotle supply
the persuader with a catalogue of 28 “universal” or “common” topics including for example
the more and the less, definition, division, induction, analogy, precedent, consequence, cause
and contradiction.5 Kienpointner mentions the medieval “hexameter of invention”, the seven
wh-questions: Who, what, where, by what means, why, how, when. (Kienpointner, pp. 227228) And Brockriede and Ehninger in their introduction to Toulmin present a list of six types
of substantive arguments: cause, sign, generalization, parallel case, analogy, and classification.
(Brockriede & Ehninger, pp. 48-50) Again, this is just to exemplify what a heuristic topoi
catalogue might contain to secure a thorough and systematic search for proof. Whether the
persuader chooses to go ad fontes to the classical list of Greek topoi or Roman loci or instead
It is noteworthy – and somewhat confusing – that the general topoi are general in the sense that they can be
applied in every type of case; and the specific topoi are in the sense that different subjects, situations, audiences
and genres call for specific catalogues. But the result of the search is the opposite: The specific topoi result in
abstract values and the general topoi result in concrete facts.
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chooses to consult contemporary taxonomies of argument types is less important to the design
of the model. What the model illustrates is that there are several places to find proof for a given
standpoint within a specific perspective.
This implies a fundamental difference between the logician’s and the rhetorician’s
understanding and use of the topoi associated with proof. Seen from the logician’s productoriented and critical point of view it is the logical form of the argument that each universal
topos represents that is of interest. We see that in Aristotle’s Topics and the argument scheme
tradition that aim for fine-grained theoretical categorization of different argument types. Seen
from a practical rhetorical point of view, on the other hand, the categorization of different
argument types is not a goal in and of itself. No doubt, it is relevant for the persuader to be
familiar with the strengths and weaknesses of each of the different general topoi in the
catalogue, as it is a way to weigh the strength of the different available proofs up against each
other. But first and foremost, the classification of different types of arguments has a practical
heuristic function. The body of universal topoi serves as a practical tool to direct a methodical
search for concrete material that could serve as proof – for instance examples, definitions,
consequences, causes and contradictions. As Sara Rubinelli expresses it: ”In particular, the
method of the Topics has general usefulness in that it helps speakers see the multiple sides of
an issue.” (Rubinelli, p. 146) So, where logic sees the topoi as formal placeholders for
arguments, rhetoric sees the topics as fruitful places to look for arguments.
4. Conclusion
When Toulmin claimed that he “had rediscovered the topics of the Topics” he was right. His
ambition to create a substantive logic that accepts a variety of different field-dependent
standards and criteria for connecting data and conclusion is materialized in Aristotle’s
dialectical work on argumentation listing hundreds of inference-warrants.
Toulmin’s tight bonds with the dialectical topics, however, are exactly what loosens the
bonds to rhetoric and a rhetorical use of the topics. It misses the essentially rhetorical approach
to argumentation as a process of discovering and choosing between the available means of
persuasion in relation to a specific audience. Where Toulmin’s interest lies in the inferential
patterns and permissions, rhetoric is interested in the persuasive process. Where Toulmin is
preoccupied with possible connections between data and claim, rhetoric is interested in what
could possibly connect the persuader and audience. Where Toulmin is preoccupied with
common standards and validity, rhetoric is preoccupied with how to establish common ground
with what an audience values. So, while Toulmin’s model has proven useful to rhetoricians, it
has also come with an unmistakable logical influence. Applying the Toulmin model is applying
a view on rhetorical argumentation, that focuses on argument evaluation, not on argument
creation. His logic might be substantive, but it is not inventive.
This makes room for a rhetorical argument model that more fully captures the inventive
process of building a persuasive argument with the aid of topical thinking. The paper offers
such a model.
Where Toulmin’s logic-born model is designed to assess an argument, the outlined
rhetoric-born argument model is designed to build it. The model guides the persuader through
the steps involved in the process of deciding what to argue for (standpoint), what to argue on
(common ground), and what to argue from (proof). The model makes visible, what is hidden
from the Toulmin model, namely the series of strategic choices involved in the process of
formulating a realistic standpoint, establishing a relevant common ground, and finding
compelling proof. These are choices between different topical “places” found in different kinds
of topoi catalogues containing types of cases, culturally shared perspectives, and types of proof.
Seen from a rhetorical point of view, the topoi are not something that comes in as a critical tool
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after the argument has been presented, they play an important part in building the argument as
a practical tool for making systematic choices.
Seen from a practical rhetorical point of view, then, the rhetorical model precedes
Toulmin’s model. We must build the argument before we can evaluate it. But that does not
mean that the outlined rhetorical argument model renders the Toulmin model – or any other
logical argument model – irrelevant. The Toulmin model will still be a useful tool for critical
“dissection” and “testing” the arguments that result from the topical process guided by the
rhetorical argument model – as Brockriede and Ehninger suggested.
Brockriede and Ehninger concluded their introduction to Toulmin’s argument model
with this hopeful final remark “All this is not meant to be the end, but rather the beginning of
an inquiry into a new, contemporary, dynamic, and usable logic for argument” (Brockriede &
Ehninger, p. 53). I would like to conclude with the hope that the outlined rhetorical argument
model can be the beginning of an inquiry into what a persuasive and inventive argument model
could look like.
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